| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15230 |
| DP15230 Corporate governance in the presence of active and passive delegated investment | |
| Adrian Aycan Corum; Andrey Malenko; Nadya Malenko | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and asset management fees are endogenously determined. Funds' ownership stakes and asset management fees determine their incentives to engage in governance. Whether passive fund growth improves aggregate governance depends on whether it crowds out private savings or active funds. In the former case, it improves governance even if accompanied by lower passive fund fees, whereas in the latter case, it improves governance only if it does not increase fund investors' returns too much. Regulations that decrease funds' costs of engaging in governance may decrease total welfare. Moreover, even when such regulations are welfare improving and increase firm valuations, they can be opposed by both fund investors and fund managers. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Delegated asset management Passive funds Index funds Competition Investment stewardship Engagement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15230 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544204 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adrian Aycan Corum,Andrey Malenko,Nadya Malenko. DP15230 Corporate governance in the presence of active and passive delegated investment. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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