| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15240 |
| DP15240 Network Centrality and Managerial Market Timing Ability | |
| Theodoros Evgeniou; Joel PERESS; Theo Vermaelen; Ling Yue | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We document that long-run excess returns following announcements of share buyback authorizations and insider purchases are a U-shape function of firm centrality in the input-output trade flow network. These results conform to a model of investors endowed with a large but finite capacity for analyzing firms. Additional links weaken insiders’ informational advantage in peripheral firms (simple firms whose cash flows depend on few economic links) provided investors’ capacity is large enough, but eventually amplify that advantage in central firms (firms with many links) due to investors’ limited capacity. These findings shed light on the sources of managerial market timing ability. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Buybacks Market timing Network centrality Insider trading Market efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15240 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544215 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Theodoros Evgeniou,Joel PERESS,Theo Vermaelen,et al. DP15240 Network Centrality and Managerial Market Timing Ability. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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