| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15241 |
| DP15241 Let’s Collude | |
| Hamid Aghadadashli | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Managers have imperfect information about each other’s willingness to collude and may signal this willingness through direct communication or market actions. Owners offer bonuses to managers and trade off productive effort provision, higher profits if managers coordinate on high prices, and the risk of antitrust fines if managers explicitly communicate. Our model shows that the distribution of fines between the owners and the managers is crucial for com- munication to be informative. High or low bonuses can reflect the willingness of owners to induce managers to explicitly communicate, and are red flags for corporate responsibility when collusion is supported by direct communication. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Communication Imperfect information Managerial firms Oligopoly Antitrust fines Incentive schemes |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15241 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544216 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hamid Aghadadashli. DP15241 Let’s Collude. 2020. |
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