| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15243 |
| DP15243 Are CEOs paid extra for riskier pay packages? | |
| Ana Albuquerque; Rui Albuquerque; Mary Ellen Carter; Flora Dong | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper quantifies the cost of CEO incentive compensation by estimating an elasticity of pay to the variance of pay. This metric is based on the benchmark moral hazard model widely used to study CEO pay. Using US CEO compensation data and a variety of empirical approaches, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages are paid more. However, the estimated elasticity of pay to the variance of pay is small. This small elasticity implies a low risk aversion coefficient for CEOs and a risk premium that is at most 12% of total pay. This risk premium is about evenly split between compensation for risk in cash bonus, stock grants, and option grants. Overall, our findings suggest that incentive pay is not too costly for firms from a risk-diversification perspective, which may explain the heavy reliance on incentive pay by US firms, and cast doubt on the ability of the benchmark moral hazard model to explain CEO pay in the US. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Ceo pay Incentives Contract theory Risk aversion Moral hazard Participation constraint Realized variance Arch Incentive lab |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15243-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544218 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ana Albuquerque,Rui Albuquerque,Mary Ellen Carter,et al. DP15243 Are CEOs paid extra for riskier pay packages?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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