| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15249 |
| DP15249 The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control | |
| Mike Burkart; Samuel Lee; Henrik Petri | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-04 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How should bidders finance tender offers when the objective of the takeover is to improve incentives? In such a setting, debt finance has benefits even when bidders have deep pockets: It amplies incentive gains, imposes Pareto sharing on bidders and free-riding target shareholders, and makes bidding competition more efficient. High leverage, independent of financing needs, can be privately and socially optimal. Although takeover debt dilutes target shareholders, they may benefit most from it, especially when bidding is competitive. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Tender offers Free-riding Debt financing Debt overhang Equity dilution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15249 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544224 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mike Burkart,Samuel Lee,Henrik Petri. DP15249 The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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