| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15264 |
| DP15264 Anger and Strategic Behavior: A Level-k Analysis | |
| Eugenio Proto; Alessandro Castagnetti | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-09 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Anger is an important driver in shaping economic activities, particularly in instances that involve strategic interactions between individuals. Here we test whether anger impairs the capacity to think strategically, and we analyze the implications of our result on bargaining and cooperation games. Accordingly, with a preregistered experiment (Experiment 1), we externally induce anger to a subgroup of subjects following a standard procedure that we verify by using a novel method of text analysis. We show that anger can impair the capacity to think strategically in a beauty contest game. Angry subjects choose numbers further away from the Nash equilibrium, and earn significantly lower profits. A structural analysis estimates that there is an increase in the share of level-zero players in the treated group compared to the control group. Furthermore, with a second preregistered experiment (Experiment 2), we show that this effect is not common to all negative emotions. Sad subjects do not play significantly further away from the Nash equilibrium than the control group in the same beauty contest game of Experiment 1, and sadness does not lead to more level-zero play. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Anger Induced emotions Strategic interactions Beauty-contest |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15264 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544239 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eugenio Proto,Alessandro Castagnetti. DP15264 Anger and Strategic Behavior: A Level-k Analysis. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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