| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15279 |
| DP15279 Pricing above value: selling to an adverse selection market | |
| jan boone | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-10 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that it is possible for intermediate goods to be priced above the value that the good has for final consumers. This happens in sectors selling to adverse selection markets where the cost difference between consumer types is dominated by their elasticity difference. High input prices then help to separate consumer types. An increase in competition can raise prices further. We use the example of pharmaceutical companies selling drugs to a health insurance market at prices exceeding value. Another feature of the model is an excessive private incentive to reduce market size, e.g. in the form of personalized medicine. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Pricing above value Vertical relations Pharmaceutical prices Risk equalization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15279 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544255 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone. DP15279 Pricing above value: selling to an adverse selection market. 2020. |
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