G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15293
DP15293 All-Pay Matching Contests
Aner Sela
发表日期2020-09-15
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, each of which includes two heterogeneous players with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in all-pay contests where they simultaneously send their costly efforts, and then are either assortatively or disassortatively matched. We characterize the players' equilibrium efforts for a general value function that assigns values for both agents who are matched as a function of their types. We then analyze the cross-effects of the players' types on their expected payoffs as well as on their expected total effort. We show that although each player's value function increases (decreases) in the types of the players in the other set, his expected payoff does not necessarily increase (decrease) in these types. In addition, depending on the value function, each player's type might have either a positive or a negative marginal effect on the players' expected total effort.
主题Industrial Organization
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15293
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544271
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Aner Sela. DP15293 All-Pay Matching Contests. 2020.
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