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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP15295 |
DP15295 Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence | |
Daron Acemoğlu; Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin | |
发表日期 | 2020-09-15 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In this essay, we provide a simple conceptual framework to elucidate the forces that lead to institutional persistence and change. Our framework is based on a dynamic game between different groups, who care both about current policies and institutions and future policies, which are themselves determined by current institutional choices, and clarifies the forces that lead to the most extreme form of institutional persistence ("institutional stasis") and the potential drivers of institutional change. We further study the strategic stability of institutions, which arises when institutions persist because of fear of subsequent, less beneficial changes that would follow initial reforms. More importantly, we emphasize that, despite the popularity of ideas based on institutional stasis in the economics and political science literatures, most institutions are in a constant state of flux, but their trajectory may still be shaped by past institutional choices, thus exhibiting "path-dependent change", so that initial conditions determine both the subsequent trajectories of institutions and how they respond to shocks. We conclude the essay by discussing how institutions can be designed to bolster stability, the relationship between social mobility and institutions, and the interplay between culture and institutions. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Conflict Constitutions Democracy Institutions Institutional change Persistence Stability |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15295 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544273 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoğlu,Georgy Egorov,Konstantin Sonin. DP15295 Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence. 2020. |
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