| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15301 |
| DP15301 Patent Screening, Innovation, and Welfare | |
| Mark Schankerman; Florian Schuett | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-17 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Critics claim that patent screening is ineffective, granting low-quality patents that impose unnecessary social costs. We develop an integrated framework, involving patent office examination, fees, and endogenous validity challenges in the courts, to study patent screening both theoretically and quantitatively. In our model, some inventions require the patent incentive while others do not, and asymmetric information creates a need for screening. We show that the endogeneity of challenges implies that courts, even if perfect, cannot solve the screening problem. Simulations of the model, calibrated on U.S. data, indicate that screening is highly imperfect, with about forty percent of all patents issued on inventions that do not require the patent incentive. While we find that the current patent system generates positive social value, intensifying examination would yield large welfare gains. The social value of the patent system would also be larger if complemented by antitrust limits on licensing. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Innovation Patent quality Screening Litigation Courts Patent fees Licensing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15301 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544278 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Schankerman,Florian Schuett. DP15301 Patent Screening, Innovation, and Welfare. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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