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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP15311 |
DP15311 Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards | |
Hans Gersbach; Akaki Mamageishvili; Oriol Tejada | |
发表日期 | 2020-09-22 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about what the right alternative is. Individuals can gather information of increasing accuracy at an increasing convex utility cost. For such a setup, we analyze how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. Our main insight is that to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative committee size must be small, no matter whether information acquisition costs are private or not. Our analysis and results cover two polar cases--information costs are either private or public--and unravel both the potential and the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Voting - committee - cost sharing - information acquisition - reward scheme - monetary transfers - majority rule |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15311 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544289 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Akaki Mamageishvili,Oriol Tejada. DP15311 Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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