全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP15311 Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP15311
	DP15311 Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards
	Hans Gersbach; Akaki Mamageishvili; Oriol Tejada
发表日期	2020-09-22
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about what the right alternative is. Individuals can gather information of increasing accuracy at an increasing convex utility cost. For such a setup, we analyze how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. Our main insight is that to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative committee size must be small, no matter whether information acquisition costs are private or not. Our analysis and results cover two polar cases--information costs are either private or public--and unravel both the potential and the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词	Voting - committee - cost sharing - information acquisition - reward scheme - monetary transfers - majority rule
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp15311
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544289
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Hans Gersbach,Akaki Mamageishvili,Oriol Tejada. DP15311 Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards. 2020.