G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15311
DP15311 Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards
Hans Gersbach; Akaki Mamageishvili; Oriol Tejada
发表日期2020-09-22
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about what the right alternative is. Individuals can gather information of increasing accuracy at an increasing convex utility cost. For such a setup, we analyze how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. Our main insight is that to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative committee size must be small, no matter whether information acquisition costs are private or not. Our analysis and results cover two polar cases--information costs are either private or public--and unravel both the potential and the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Voting - committee - cost sharing - information acquisition - reward scheme - monetary transfers - majority rule
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15311
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544289
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Hans Gersbach,Akaki Mamageishvili,Oriol Tejada. DP15311 Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards. 2020.
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