G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15322
DP15322 Monetary Policy with a Central Bank Digital Currency: The Short and the Long Term
Florian Böser; Hans Gersbach
发表日期2020-09-28
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We examine how the introduction of an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) impacts bank activities and monetary policy. Depositors can switch from bank deposits to CBDC as a safe medium of exchange at any time. As banks face digital runs, either because depositors have a preference for CBDC or fear bank insolvency, monetary policy can use collateral requirements (and default penalties) to initially increase bankers' monitoring incentives. This leads to higher aggregate productivity. However, the mass of households holding CBDC will increase over time, causing additional liquidity risk for banks. After a certain period, monetary policy with tight collateral requirements generating liquidity risk for banks and exposing bankers to default penalties would render banking non-viable and prompt the central bank to abandon such policies. Under these circumstances, bankers' monitoring incentives will revert to low levels. Accordingly, a CBDC can at best yield short-term welfare gains.
主题Financial Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词Central bank digital currency - monetary policy - banks - deposits
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15322
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544303
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Florian Böser,Hans Gersbach. DP15322 Monetary Policy with a Central Bank Digital Currency: The Short and the Long Term. 2020.
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