G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15324
DP15324 Collective Information Acquisition
Kfir Eliaz; Ran Eilat
发表日期2020-09-29
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We consider the problem faced by a group of players who need to collectively decide what public signal to acquire, and how to share its cost, before voting on whether to take some action, when each player is privately informed about his state-dependent payoffs from the action. We characterize the welfare maximizing mechanism for information acquisition taking into account the subsequent voting game. We identify novel distortions that arise from the information asymmetry and from the fact that after observing the signal realization, the players vote independently of their actions in the mechanism.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Collective decision-making Mechanism-design Information-design Rational inattention Public good provision
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15324
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544305
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kfir Eliaz,Ran Eilat. DP15324 Collective Information Acquisition. 2020.
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