| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15324 |
| DP15324 Collective Information Acquisition | |
| Kfir Eliaz; Ran Eilat | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider the problem faced by a group of players who need to collectively decide what public signal to acquire, and how to share its cost, before voting on whether to take some action, when each player is privately informed about his state-dependent payoffs from the action. We characterize the welfare maximizing mechanism for information acquisition taking into account the subsequent voting game. We identify novel distortions that arise from the information asymmetry and from the fact that after observing the signal realization, the players vote independently of their actions in the mechanism. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collective decision-making Mechanism-design Information-design Rational inattention Public good provision |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15324 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544305 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kfir Eliaz,Ran Eilat. DP15324 Collective Information Acquisition. 2020. |
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