全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP15333 Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP15333
	DP15333 Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
	Clare Leaver; Owen Ozier; Pieter Serneels; Andrew Zeitlin
发表日期	2020-10-02
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay-for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.
主题	Development Economics ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词	Pay-for-performance Selection Incentives Teachers Field experiment
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp15333
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544314
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Clare Leaver,Owen Ozier,Pieter Serneels,et al. DP15333 Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools. 2020.