| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15376 |
| DP15376 Profit-splitting Rules and the Taxation of Multinational Digital Platforms | |
| Francis Bloch; Gabrielle Demange | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-16 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the strategy of a monopolistic digital platform serving users from two jurisdictions with different corporate tax rates. We consider two profit-splitting rules, Separate Accounting (SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA) based on the number of users in the two jurisdictions. We show that, even in the absence of transfer pricing, the platform shifts profit from the high-tax to the low-tax jurisdiction exploiting network externalities under SA and manipulating the apportionment key under FA. In order to shift profit, the platform distorts prices and quantities. Under SA, the direction of the distortions depends on the sign of the externalities. We use a numerical simulation to show that the ranking of fiscal revenues under the two r\'{e}gimes differ in the two jurisdictions: the high-tax jurisdiction prefers SA to FA whereas the low-tax jurisdiction prefers FA to SA. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Digital platforms Multinational firms Corporate income taxation Formula apportionment Separate accountin |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15376 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544359 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francis Bloch,Gabrielle Demange. DP15376 Profit-splitting Rules and the Taxation of Multinational Digital Platforms. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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