| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15377 |
| DP15377 Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources | |
| Marek Pycia; M. Utku Ünver | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-17 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In environments where heterogeneous indivisible resources are being allocated without monetary transfers and each agent has a unit demand, we show that an allocation mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient, i.e., it always selects the best outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Re-interpreting Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in terms of auditability of the mechanism, we further show that these are precisely the mechanisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and auditable. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15377 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544360 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marek Pycia,M. Utku Ünver. DP15377 Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources. 2020. |
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