G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15378
DP15378 Uncertainty and Contracting in Organizations
David Dicks; Paolo Fulghieri
发表日期2020-10-17
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We study a multidivisional firm where headquarters are exposed to moral hazard by division managers under uncertainty (or "ambiguity") aversion. We show the aggregation and linearity results of Holmström and Milgrom (1987) hold in an environment with IID ambiguity, as in Chen and Epstein (2002). While uncertainty creates endogenous disagreement that aggravates moral hazard, by hedging uncertainty headquarters can design incentive contracts that reduce disagreement, lower incentive provision costs, and promote effort. Because hedging uncertainty can conflict with hedging risk, optimal contracts differ from standard principal-agent models. Optimal contracts involve exposure to other divisions even when division cash flows are uncorrelated and, with sufficient uncertainty, involve equity-based pay, even when division cash-flows are positively correlated. Our model helps explain the prevalence of equity-based incentive contracts and the rarity of relative performance contracts.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Ambiguity Incentive contracting
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15378
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544361
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
David Dicks,Paolo Fulghieri. DP15378 Uncertainty and Contracting in Organizations. 2020.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[David Dicks]的文章
[Paolo Fulghieri]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[David Dicks]的文章
[Paolo Fulghieri]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[David Dicks]的文章
[Paolo Fulghieri]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。