| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP15378
|
| DP15378 Uncertainty and Contracting in Organizations |
| David Dicks; Paolo Fulghieri
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-17
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study a multidivisional firm where headquarters are exposed to moral hazard by division managers under uncertainty (or "ambiguity") aversion. We show the aggregation and linearity results of Holmström and Milgrom (1987) hold in an environment with IID ambiguity, as in Chen and Epstein (2002). While uncertainty creates endogenous disagreement that aggravates moral hazard, by hedging uncertainty headquarters can design incentive contracts that reduce disagreement, lower incentive provision costs, and promote effort. Because hedging uncertainty can conflict with hedging risk, optimal contracts differ from standard principal-agent models. Optimal contracts involve exposure to other divisions even when division cash flows are uncorrelated and, with sufficient uncertainty, involve equity-based pay, even when division cash-flows are positively correlated. Our model helps explain the prevalence of equity-based incentive contracts and the rarity of relative performance contracts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Ambiguity
Incentive contracting
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15378
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544361
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
David Dicks,Paolo Fulghieri. DP15378 Uncertainty and Contracting in Organizations. 2020.
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