| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15389 |
| DP15389 Grantmaking | |
| Marco Ottaviani | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper develops a foundational model of the decentralized allocation of subsidies through competitive grantmaking. Casting the problem in a simple supply and demand framework, we characterize the level of applications and acceptance standard that result in equilibrium. The equilibrium success rate (grants over applications) decreases in the budget, consistent with some recent evidence, if and only if the distribution of types has decreasing hazard rate. In all stable equilibria resulting when funds are allocated across fields proportionally to applications--as well as under apportionment rules in a general class characterized in the paper--an increase in noise in the evaluation in a field perversely raises applications in that field and reduces applications in all the other fields. We characterize how the design of allocation rules can be modified to improve welfare. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Grants Applications Grading on a curve Evaluation across fields Formula-based allocation Proportional allocation Payline Unraveling Signal noise |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15389 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544374 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Ottaviani. DP15389 Grantmaking. 2020. |
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