| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15398 |
| DP15398 Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan | |
| Morten Bennedsen; Vikas Mehrotra; Jungwook Shim; Yupana Wiwattanakantang | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-22 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Family control Ownership Succession |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15398 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544384 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Morten Bennedsen,Vikas Mehrotra,Jungwook Shim,et al. DP15398 Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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