| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15401 |
| DP15401 Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote | |
| Felix Bierbrauer; Mattias Polborn | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-22 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitive legislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a party that wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts. We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a design perspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two parties who both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achieve two desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to the popular vote. Second, most districts are competitive. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Gerrymandering Legislative elections Redistricting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15401 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544385 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Felix Bierbrauer,Mattias Polborn. DP15401 Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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