| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15406 |
| DP15406 Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining | |
| T. Renee Bowen; Stefan Krasa; Ilwoo Hwang | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-25 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a dynamic bargaining model between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter’s proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her “personal power”. The players learn about the setter’s power as gridlock persists. Gridlock occurs when the setter’s perceived power is either too high or too low, and the players reach compromise in an intermediate interval of beliefs. The presence of “difficult” issues can induce more compromise as the players have incentives to avoid learning. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Power Gridlock Learning |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15406 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544392 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | T. Renee Bowen,Stefan Krasa,Ilwoo Hwang. DP15406 Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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