| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15413 |
| DP15413 Financial Policymaking after Crises: Public vs. Private Interest | |
| Orkun Saka; Yuemei Ji; Paul De Grauwe | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What drives actual government policies after financial crises? In this paper, we first present a simple model of post-crisis policymaking driven by both public and private interests. Using the most comprehensive dataset available on de-facto financial liberalization over seven policy domains across 94 countries between 1973 and 2015, we then establish that financial crises can lead to more government intervention and a process of re-regulation in financial markets. Consistent with a demand channel from public (interests) to policymakers, we find that post-crisis interventions are common only in democratic countries. However, by using a plausibly exogenous political setting -i.e., term limits- muting policymakers' accountability, we show that democratic leaders who do not have re-election concerns are substantially more likely to intervene in financial markets after crises, in ways that promote their private interests. These privately-motivated interventions cannot be associated with immediate crisis response, operate via controversial policy domains and favour incumbent banks in countries with more revolving doors between political and financial institutions. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15413 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544401 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Orkun Saka,Yuemei Ji,Paul De Grauwe. DP15413 Financial Policymaking after Crises: Public vs. Private Interest. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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