| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14328 |
| DP14328 Financial Incentives and Competitive Pressure: The Case of the Hospital Industry | |
| Philippe Chone; Lionel Wilner | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-03 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the late 2000s, a regulatory reform dramatically strengthened the incentives of French nonprofit hospitals to attract patients. Exploiting exhaustive data for surgery treatments and modeling hospitals as supplying utility to patients, we show that increased competitive pressure on nonprofit hospitals caused them to perform more procedures but did not inflate overall activity. Although they have gained market shares, nonprofit hospitals have been significantly worse off after the reform. To adjust to stronger financial incentives, they incurred an additional effort (pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs) equivalent to about a quarter of their annual revenue. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competition in utility space Financial incentives Payment reform Hospital choice |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14328-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544409 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Chone,Lionel Wilner. DP14328 Financial Incentives and Competitive Pressure: The Case of the Hospital Industry. 2020. |
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