| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15433 |
| DP15433 Optimal Subsidies for Prevention of Infectious Disease | |
| Michael Kremer; Heidi Williams; Christopher Snyder; Matthew Goodkin-Gold | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most economists would agree that the positive externalities caused by prevention of infectious disease create a prima facie case for subsidies. However, little is known about the appropriate magnitude of these subsidies, or about whether the level of such subsidies should vary across diseases. We integrate a standard epidemiological model with an economic model of consumer and producer behavior to address these questions. Across a continuum of market structures, we find that the equilibrium steady-state marginal externality is non-monotonic in disease transmissiblity, peaking when the disease is just transmissible enough to survive in steady-state. This pattern implies that marginal externalities—and, as we show, optimal subsidies—are higher for serious but rare diseases relative to diseases with lower individual burden but higher disease prevalence. Crude calibrations suggest that optimal subsidies for technologies such as vaccines, condoms, and mosquito nets, which prevent infectious diseases, may be very large relative to current levels. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Vaccine Epidemiology Externality Pharmaceutical |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15433 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544424 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Kremer,Heidi Williams,Christopher Snyder,et al. DP15433 Optimal Subsidies for Prevention of Infectious Disease. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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