| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15445 |
| DP15445 Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures | |
| José-Luis Peydró; Gabriel Jiménez; Mikel Bedayo; Raquel Vegas | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-12 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that loan origination time is key for bank credit standards, defaults and failures over the cycle. We use the credit register from Spain, with the time of a loan application and its granting. When VIX is lower, banks shorten loan origination time, especially to less-capitalized firms. Bank moral hazard incentives (competition and capital) are crucial drivers. Moreover, shorter (loan-level) origination time implies higher ex-post defaults, especially for less-capitalized firms in areas with higher bank competition or when VIX is lower. Finally, shorter pre-crisis origination time involves more bank-level failures, even more than other lending conditions, consistent with lower screening. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Loan origination time Lending standards over the cycle Defaults Bank failures Screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15445-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544439 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | José-Luis Peydró,Gabriel Jiménez,Mikel Bedayo,et al. DP15445 Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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