| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15457 |
| DP15457 Monetary Policy with Reserves and CBDC: Optimality, Equivalence, and Politics | |
| Dirk Niepelt | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-16 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze policy in a two-tiered monetary system. Noncompetitive banks issue deposits while the central bank issues reserves and a retail CBDC. Monies differ with respect to operating costs and liquidity. We map the framework into a baseline business cycle model with "pseudo wedges" and derive optimal policy rules: Spreads satisfy modified Friedman rules and deposits must be taxed or subsidized. We generalize the Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) result on the macro irrelevance of CBDC but show that a deposit based payment system requires higher taxes. The model implies annual implicit subsidies to U.S. banks of up to 0.8 percent of GDP during the period 1999-2017. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Reserves Deposits Central bank digital currency monetary policy Friedman rule Equivalence Ramsey policy Bank profits Money creation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15457 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544453 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Niepelt. DP15457 Monetary Policy with Reserves and CBDC: Optimality, Equivalence, and Politics. 2020. |
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