G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15463
DP15463 Vertical Integration and Foreclosure: Evidence from Production Network Data
Johannes Boehm; Jan Sonntag
发表日期2020-11-17
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the prevalence of potential anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers using a novel dataset on U.S. and international buyer-seller relationships, and across a large range of industries. We find that relationships are more likely to break when suppliers vertically integrate with one of the buyers' competitors than when they vertically integrate with an unrelated firm. This relationship holds for both domestic and cross-border mergers, and for domestic and international relationships. It also holds when instrumenting mergers using exogenous downward pressure on the supplier's stock prices, suggesting that reverse causality is unlikely to explain the result. In contrast, the relationship vanishes when using rumored or announced but not completed integration events. Firms experience a substantial drop in sales when one of their suppliers integrates with one of their competitors. This sales drop is mitigated if the firm has alternative suppliers in place. These findings are consistent with anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers, such as vertical foreclosure, rising input costs for rivals, or self-foreclosure.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Mergers and acquisitions Market foreclosure Vertical integration Production networks
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15463
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544460
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Johannes Boehm,Jan Sonntag. DP15463 Vertical Integration and Foreclosure: Evidence from Production Network Data. 2020.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Johannes Boehm]的文章
[Jan Sonntag]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Johannes Boehm]的文章
[Jan Sonntag]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Johannes Boehm]的文章
[Jan Sonntag]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。