| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15472 |
| DP15472 Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure | |
| Marco Pagnozzi; Salvatore Piccolo; Markus Reisinger | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-19 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze vertical contracting between a manufacturer and retailers who have correlated private information. The manufacturer chooses the number of retailers and secretly contracts with each of them. We highlight a new trade-off between limiting competition and reducing retailers' information rents that shapes the optimal size of the distribution network. We show how the manufacturer's technology and the characteristics of demand affect this distribution network. In contrast to previous literature, we show that the manufacturer may choose a number of retailers that exceeds the socially optimal one, and that vertical integration can raise consumer welfare. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Distribution network Opportunism Retail market structure Vertical contracting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15472 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544468 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Pagnozzi,Salvatore Piccolo,Markus Reisinger. DP15472 Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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