| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15483 |
| DP15483 Mediating Conflict in the Lab | |
| Alessandra Casella; Evan Friedman; Manuel Perez Archila | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Mechanism design teaches us that a mediator can strictly improve the chances of peace between two opponents even when the mediator has no independent resources, is less informed than the two parties, and has no enforcement power. We test the theory in a lab experiment where two subjects negotiate how to share a resource; in case of conflict, the subjects' privately known strength determines their payoffs. The subjects send cheap talk messages about their strength to one another (in the treatment with direct communication) or to the mediator (in the mediation treatment), before making their demands or receiving the mediator's recommendations. We find that, in line with the theory, messages are significantly more sincere when sent to the mediator. However, contrary to the theory, peaceful resolution is not more frequent, even when the mediator is a computer implementing the optimal mediation program. While the theoretical result refers to the best (i.e. most peaceful) equilibrium under mediation, multiple equilibria exist, and the best equilibrium is particularly vulnerable to small deviations from full truthfulness. Subjects are not erratic and their deviations induce only small losses in payoffs, and yet they translate into significant increases in conflict. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Mediation Conflict resolution Mechanism design Laboratory experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15483 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544479 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Evan Friedman,Manuel Perez Archila. DP15483 Mediating Conflict in the Lab. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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