| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15488 |
| DP15488 Public Debt as Private Liquidity: Optimal Policy | |
| Fabrice Collard; Harris Dellas; George-Marios Angeletos | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-24 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study optimal policy in an economy in which public debt is used as collateral or liquidity buffer. Issuing more public debt raises welfare by easing the underlying financial friction; but this easing lowers the liquidity premium and increases the government's cost of borrowing. These considerations, which are absent in the basic Ramsey paradigm, help pin down a unique, long-run level of public debt. They require a front-loaded tax response to government-spending shocks, instead of tax smoothing. And they explain why a financial recession, more than a traditional one, makes government borrowing cheaper, optimally supporting larger fiscal stimuli. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth |
| 关键词 | Piblic debt Private liquidity Optimal policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15488 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544486 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabrice Collard,Harris Dellas,George-Marios Angeletos. DP15488 Public Debt as Private Liquidity: Optimal Policy. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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