G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15488
DP15488 Public Debt as Private Liquidity: Optimal Policy
Fabrice Collard; Harris Dellas; George-Marios Angeletos
发表日期2020-11-24
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We study optimal policy in an economy in which public debt is used as collateral or liquidity buffer. Issuing more public debt raises welfare by easing the underlying financial friction; but this easing lowers the liquidity premium and increases the government's cost of borrowing. These considerations, which are absent in the basic Ramsey paradigm, help pin down a unique, long-run level of public debt. They require a front-loaded tax response to government-spending shocks, instead of tax smoothing. And they explain why a financial recession, more than a traditional one, makes government borrowing cheaper, optimally supporting larger fiscal stimuli.
主题Macroeconomics and Growth
关键词Piblic debt Private liquidity Optimal policy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15488
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544486
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Fabrice Collard,Harris Dellas,George-Marios Angeletos. DP15488 Public Debt as Private Liquidity: Optimal Policy. 2020.
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