| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15492 |
| DP15492 Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study | |
| Petra Nieken; Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-25 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate contract negotiations in the presence of externalities and asymmetric information in a controlled laboratory experiment. In our setup, it is commonly known that it is always ex post efficient for player A to implement a project which has an external effect on player B. Yet, player A has private information about whether or not it is in player A's self-interest to implement the project even when no agreement with player B is reached. Theoretically, an ex post efficient agreement can always be reached if the externality is large, whereas this is not the case if the externality is small. We vary the size of the externality and the bargaining process. The experimental results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. Yet, even when the externality is large, the players fail to achieve ex post efficiency in a substantial fraction of the observations. This finding holds in the case of ultimatum game bargaining as well as in the case of unstructured bargaining with free-form communication. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contracts Externalities Bargaining Communication Laboratory experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15492 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544490 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Petra Nieken,Patrick W. Schmitz. DP15492 Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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