| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15498 |
| DP15498 Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning | |
| Francesco Amodio; Miguel Martinez-Carrasco | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-26 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies learning within organizations when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show how, in the presence of imperfect information over the shape of the production function, workers' effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed. We also show that changing incentives can trigger this learning process. We test this prediction using personnel data from an egg production plant in Peru. Exploiting a sudden change in the contract parameters, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Organizational learning Workplace incentives Inputs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15498-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544498 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Amodio,Miguel Martinez-Carrasco. DP15498 Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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