| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15505 |
| DP15505 Binary Outcomes and Linear Interactions | |
| Vincent Boucher; Yann Bramoullé | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) first showed that binary outcomes are compatible with linear econometric models of interactions. This key insight was unduly discarded by the literature on the econometrics of games. We consider general models of linear interactions in binary outcomes that nest linear models of peer effects in networks and linear models of entry games. We characterize when these models are well defined. Errors must have a specific discrete structure. We then analyze the models’ game-theoretic microfoundations. Under complete information and linear utilities, we characterize the preference shocks under which the linear model of interactions forms a Nash equilibrium of the game. Under incomplete information and independence, we show that the linear model of interactions forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if and only if preference shocks are iid and uniformly distributed. We also obtain conditions for uniqueness. Finally, we propose two simple consistent estimators. We revisit the empirical analyses of teenage smoking and peer effects of Lee, Li, and Lin (2014) and of entry into airline markets of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). Our reanalyses showcase the main interests of the linear framework and suggest that the estimations in these two studies suffer from endogeneity problems. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Binary outcomes Linear probability model Peer effects Econometrics of games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15505 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544506 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincent Boucher,Yann Bramoullé. DP15505 Binary Outcomes and Linear Interactions. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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