G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15508
DP15508 On the (Ir)relevance of Firm Size for Bail-outs under Voter-Neutrality: The Case of Foreign Stakeholders
Linda Schilling
发表日期2020-12-02
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要A failing firm employs domestic and foreign stakeholders. The latter have no voting rights. A politician decides on the vote-share maximizing bailout. In a probabilistic voting model, I analyze whether foreign stakeholders impact bailouts. Stakeholder voters shade their vote to reward the politician, while non-stakeholder voters punish the politician for imposing bailout-financing taxes. If foreign stakeholders neither pay taxes nor receive bailouts (seasonal workers), only voters at the firm level matter. Firms with equally large stakeholder groups receive distinct bailouts in equilibrium, depending on their voter-concentration among stakeholders. If foreigners pay taxes and receive bailouts (greencard holders), they impact the electorate and thus bailouts through monetary transfers despite their lack of voting rights. Then adding foreigners can both increase or decrease bailouts. The measure of all firm stakeholders remains insufficient to determine bailouts. In either case, vote-share maximizing bailouts equal socially optimal bailouts only if all stakeholders are domestic.
主题Financial Economics ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics
关键词Bailouts Political economy Economic voting Probabilistic voting Vote-share maximization Too-big-to-fail Labor migration Socially optimal bailouts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15508
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544509
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Linda Schilling. DP15508 On the (Ir)relevance of Firm Size for Bail-outs under Voter-Neutrality: The Case of Foreign Stakeholders. 2020.
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