| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP15511
|
| DP15511 Toxic Types and Infectious Communication Breakdown |
| Kfir Eliaz; Alexander Frug
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-03
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We introduce a new reason for why an informed sender may not be able to communicate(via cheap talk) his private information to an uninformed receiver. Our framework has two novel features: (i) conditional on interacting, both parties agree on the optimal action to take given the sender’s information, and (ii) there are some sender types (the “toxic” types) with which the receiver prefers not to interact. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of preferences, any interval equilibrium (where each message is associated with an interval of types) induces only finitely many actions in the support of the receiver’s strategy. For a canonical class of preferences with uniformly distributed types, we characterize the Pareto efficient(interval) equilibria and illustrate how communication is adversely affected even with a small set of toxic types. In addition, we show that introducing a second stage in which the receiver gets a noisy signal on the sender type can have a dramatic effect on the first-stage communication. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Cheap talk
Contagion
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15511
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544513
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Kfir Eliaz,Alexander Frug. DP15511 Toxic Types and Infectious Communication Breakdown. 2020.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
