| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15514 |
| DP15514 Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-03 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The analysis of adverse selection problems in seller-buyer relationships has typically been based on the assumption that private information is uncertifiable, while in practice it may well be certifiable. If a buyer has certifiable private information, he can conceal evidence, but he cannot claim to have information for which he has no evidence, so he has fewer possibilities to misrepresent his information. Nevertheless, we find that the expected total surplus can be strictly smaller in the case of certifiable information than in the case of uncertifiable information. This finding holds when the buyer may have private information with some exogenous probability as well as in the case of opportunistic information gathering, where the buyer can privately decide whether or not to acquire information for strategic reasons. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contracting Asymmetric information Adverse selection Screening Information gathering |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15514 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544516 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP15514 Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information. 2020. |
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