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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP15520 |
DP15520 Exploiting rivals' strengths | |
Giacomo Calzolari; Vincenzo Denicolò | |
发表日期 | 2020-12-06 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Contracts that reference rivals' volumes (RRV contracts), such as exclusive dealing or market-share rebates, have been a long-standing concern in antitrust because of their possible exclusionary effects. We show, however, that it is more profitable to use these contracts to exploit rivals rather than to foreclose them. By optimally designing RRV contracts, a dominant firm may, indeed, obtain higher profits than if it were an unchallenged monopolist. In the most favorable cases, it can earn as much as if it could eliminate the competition and acquire the rivals' specific technological capabilities free of charge. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Exploitation Foreclosure Market-share discounts Exclusive dealing |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15520 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544522 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò. DP15520 Exploiting rivals' strengths. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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