G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15520
DP15520 Exploiting rivals' strengths
Giacomo Calzolari; Vincenzo Denicolò
发表日期2020-12-06
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Contracts that reference rivals' volumes (RRV contracts), such as exclusive dealing or market-share rebates, have been a long-standing concern in antitrust because of their possible exclusionary effects. We show, however, that it is more profitable to use these contracts to exploit rivals rather than to foreclose them. By optimally designing RRV contracts, a dominant firm may, indeed, obtain higher profits than if it were an unchallenged monopolist. In the most favorable cases, it can earn as much as if it could eliminate the competition and acquire the rivals' specific technological capabilities free of charge.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Exploitation Foreclosure Market-share discounts Exclusive dealing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15520
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544522
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò. DP15520 Exploiting rivals' strengths. 2020.
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