| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15537 |
| DP15537 Asymmetric Information and Delegated Selling | |
| Maarten Janssen; Santanu Roy | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-09 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Asymmetric information about product quality can create incentives for a privately informed manufacturer to sell to uninformed consumers through a retailer and to maintain secrecy of upstream pricing. Delegating retail price setting to an intermediary generates pooling equilibria that avoid signaling distortions associated with direct selling even under reasonable restrictions on beliefs; these beliefs can also prevent double marginalization by the retailer. Expected profit, consumer surplus and social welfare can all be higher with intermediated selling. However, if secrecy of upstream pricing cannot be maintained, selling through a retailer can only lower the expected profit of the manufacturer. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Product quality Delegation Intermediary Signaling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15537-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544539 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maarten Janssen,Santanu Roy. DP15537 Asymmetric Information and Delegated Selling. 2020. |
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