G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15555
DP15555 Central Bank Digital Currency: When Price and Bank Stability Collide
Linda Schilling; Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde; Harald Uhlig
发表日期2020-12-14
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要A central bank digital currency, or CBDC, may provide an attractive alternative to traditional demand deposits held in private banks. When offering CBDC accounts, the central bank needs to confront classic issues of banking: conducting maturity transformation while providing liquidity to private customers who suffer "spending'' shocks. We analyze these issues in a nominal version of a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, with an additional and exogenous price stability objective for the central bank. While the central bank can always deliver on its nominal obligations, runs can nonetheless occur, manifesting themselves either as excessive real asset liquidation or as a failure to maintain price stability. We demonstrate an impossibility result that we call the CBDC trilemma: of the three goals of efficiency, financial stability (i.e., absence of runs), and price stability, the central bank can achieve at most two.
主题Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词Central bank digital currency monetary policy Bank runs Financial intermediation Inflation targeting Cbdc trilemma
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15555
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544561
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Linda Schilling,Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde,Harald Uhlig. DP15555 Central Bank Digital Currency: When Price and Bank Stability Collide. 2020.
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