| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15567 |
| DP15567 The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract | |
| Daniel Müller; Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A principal hires an agent to provide a verifiable service. Initially, the agent can exert unobservable effort to reduce his disutility from providing the service. If the agent is free to waive his right to quit, he may voluntarily sign a contract specifying an inefficiently large service level, while there are insufficient incentives to exert effort. If the agent's right to quit is inalienable, the underprovision of effort may be further aggravated, but the service level is ex post efficient. Overall, it turns out that the total surplus can be larger when agents are not permitted to contractually waive their right to quit work. Yet, we also study an extension of our model in which even the agent can be strictly better off when the parties have the contractual freedom to waive the agent's right to quit. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Moral hazard Incentive theory Labor contracts Efficiency wages Law and economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15567 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544573 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Müller,Patrick W. Schmitz. DP15567 The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
