| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15580 |
| DP15580 The multiple-volunteers principle | |
| Susanne Goldlücke; Thomas Tröger | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider mechanisms for assigning an unpleasant task among a group of agents with heterogenous abilities. We emphasize threshold rules: every agent decides whether or not to ``volunteer''; if the number of volunteers exceeds a threshold number, the task is assigned to a random volunteer; if the number is below the threshold, the task is assigned to a random non-volunteer. We show that any non-extreme threshold rule allows for a symmetric equilibrium in which every ability type is strictly better off than in a random assignment. This holds for arbitrarily high costs of performing the task. Within the class of binary-action mechanisms, some threshold rule is utilitarian optimal. The first-best can be approximated arbitrarily closely with a threshold rule as the group size tends to infinity; that is, there exist threshold numbers such that with probability arbitrarily close to 1 the task is performed by an agent with an ability arbitrarily close to the highest possible ability. The optimal threshold number goes to infinity as the group size tends to infinity. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Volunteering Mechanism design without transfers Public good provision |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15580 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544588 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Susanne Goldlücke,Thomas Tröger. DP15580 The multiple-volunteers principle. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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