| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15622 |
| DP15622 Informed Enforcement: Lessons from Pollution Monitoring in China | |
| Sebastian Axbard; Zichen Deng | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Government regulations are often imperfectly enforced by public officials. In this study, we investigate if real-time monitoring of policy outcomes can improve enforcement of existing regulations by exploring the introduction of air pollution monitors in China. Exploiting assignment criteria established by the central government and new geo-referenced data on local enforcement activities, we show that monitoring: 1) increases enforcement against local firms, 2) improves the targeting of enforcement, and 3) reduces aggregate pollution. These effects are driven by officials facing performance incentives and are stronger when there is limited scope for data manipulation, suggesting that real-time monitoring improves top-down accountability. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Accountability Regulatory enforcement Pollution China |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15622 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544637 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sebastian Axbard,Zichen Deng. DP15622 Informed Enforcement: Lessons from Pollution Monitoring in China. 2020. |
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