| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15625 |
| DP15625 The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring | |
| Pierre Chaigneau; Nicolas Sahuguet | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-02 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When assessing managerial ability, a firm can rely on two sources of information: a signal of firm value, such as earnings, and monitoring. We show that a more informative signal can surprisingly increase the value of monitoring. This happens if a more informative signal makes some signal realizations more ambiguous indicators of managerial ability, or if the signal leads to negative belief updating on managerial ability yet does not trigger termination. Then, termination decisions will paradoxically rely less on the signal when it is more informative. In private equity owned firms, the model predicts that monitoring intensity is increasing in signal informativeness conditional on a bad performance. These firms can fall into a "bad governance trap" such that a less informative signal is compounded by worse monitoring upon a bad performance. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Board monitoring Corporate governance system Governance complementarity Hard and soft information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15625 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544640 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Chaigneau,Nicolas Sahuguet. DP15625 The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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