| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15627 |
| DP15627 Test Design under Falsification | |
| Vasiliki Skreta; Eduardo Perez-Richet | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-03 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the optimal design of tests with manipulable inputs: data, actions, reports. An agent can, at a cost, falsify the input into the test, or state of the world, so as to influence the downstream binary decision of a receiver informed by the test. We characterize receiver-optimal tests under different constraints. Under covert falsification, the receiver-optimal test is inefficient. With a rich state space, it involves equilibrium falsification at a possibly large cost to the agent, and may therefore exert a negative social externality. The receiver-optimal test that is immune to falsification, while also inefficient, strictly improves the payoff of the agent. When the falsification strategy of the agent is observable, or can be committed to, the receiver-optimal test is efficient, uses a rich signal space, and gives the receiver at least half of his full information payoff. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information design Falsification Tests Manipulation Cheating Bayesian persuasion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15627 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544642 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vasiliki Skreta,Eduardo Perez-Richet. DP15627 Test Design under Falsification. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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