G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15627
DP15627 Test Design under Falsification
Vasiliki Skreta; Eduardo Perez-Richet
发表日期2021-01-03
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study the optimal design of tests with manipulable inputs: data, actions, reports. An agent can, at a cost, falsify the input into the test, or state of the world, so as to influence the downstream binary decision of a receiver informed by the test. We characterize receiver-optimal tests under different constraints. Under covert falsification, the receiver-optimal test is inefficient. With a rich state space, it involves equilibrium falsification at a possibly large cost to the agent, and may therefore exert a negative social externality. The receiver-optimal test that is immune to falsification, while also inefficient, strictly improves the payoff of the agent. When the falsification strategy of the agent is observable, or can be committed to, the receiver-optimal test is efficient, uses a rich signal space, and gives the receiver at least half of his full information payoff.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Information design Falsification Tests Manipulation Cheating Bayesian persuasion
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15627
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544642
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Vasiliki Skreta,Eduardo Perez-Richet. DP15627 Test Design under Falsification. 2021.
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