| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15637 |
| DP15637 Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions | |
| Marina Agranov; Ahrash Dianat; Larry Samuelson; Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability; their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form "from the top down" in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Matching Incomplete information Stability Experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15637 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544651 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Agranov,Ahrash Dianat,Larry Samuelson,et al. DP15637 Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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