| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15641 |
| DP15641 A political economy of loose means-testing in targeted social programs | |
| Helmuth Cremer; Justina Klimaviciute; Pierre Pestieau | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-06 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the political sustainability of programs that are targeted towards the poor. Given that the poor to whom these programs cater do not constitute a majority, we show that for their own good it pays to let the middle class benefit from them in a random way. This approach mimics the actual institutional arrangements whereby middle-class individuals feel that they can successfully apply to the programs. We consider a two stage decision process: first a Rawlsian government chooses the probability at which the middle class is allowed to benefit from a given program; then, majority voting determines the level of benefit and the rate of contribution. At the first, constitutional stage, the government cannot commit to a specific level of taxes and benefit but anticipates that these are set by majority voting in the second stage. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Targeted transfers Political support Redistribution paradox |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15641 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544655 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helmuth Cremer,Justina Klimaviciute,Pierre Pestieau. DP15641 A political economy of loose means-testing in targeted social programs. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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