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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP15656 |
DP15656 Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid | |
Marek Pycia; Kyle Woodward | |
发表日期 | 2021-01-11 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The pay-as-bid (or discriminatory) auction is a prominent format for selling homogenous goods such as treasury securities and commodities. We prove the uniqueness of its pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and establish a tractable representation of equilibrium bids. Building on these results we analyze the optimal design of pay-as-bid auctions, as well as uniform-price auctions (the main alternative auction format), allowing for asymmetric information. We show that supply transparency and full disclosure are optimal in pay-as-bid, though not necessarily in uniform-price; pay-as-bid is revenue dominant and might be welfare dominant; and, under assumptions commonly imposed in empirical work, the two formats are revenue and welfare equivalent. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15656 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544668 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marek Pycia,Kyle Woodward. DP15656 Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid. 2021. |
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