G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15656
DP15656 Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid
Marek Pycia; Kyle Woodward
发表日期2021-01-11
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要The pay-as-bid (or discriminatory) auction is a prominent format for selling homogenous goods such as treasury securities and commodities. We prove the uniqueness of its pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and establish a tractable representation of equilibrium bids. Building on these results we analyze the optimal design of pay-as-bid auctions, as well as uniform-price auctions (the main alternative auction format), allowing for asymmetric information. We show that supply transparency and full disclosure are optimal in pay-as-bid, though not necessarily in uniform-price; pay-as-bid is revenue dominant and might be welfare dominant; and, under assumptions commonly imposed in empirical work, the two formats are revenue and welfare equivalent.
主题Industrial Organization
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15656
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544668
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marek Pycia,Kyle Woodward. DP15656 Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid. 2021.
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