| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP15672
|
| DP15672 Discrimination in Promotion |
| Anja Prummer; Francesco Nava
|
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-15
|
| 出版年 | 2021
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Does an employer benefit from inducing differential value distributions for a promotion among his workers? Workers compete by exerting effort and higher effort corresponds to higher profit for the employer. Introducing inequalities in valuations makes workers' value more easily recognisable, reducing their information rent, which in turn increases effort. At the same time, inequalities lead to differences in promotion attainment, even if realised values are identical. This corresponds to a decrease in competition. We show that if value is re-distributed, the reduction in information rent outweighs the loss in competition, making discrimination between workers optimal. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15672
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544683
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Anja Prummer,Francesco Nava. DP15672 Discrimination in Promotion. 2021.
|
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