G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15672
DP15672 Discrimination in Promotion
Anja Prummer; Francesco Nava
发表日期2021-01-15
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要Does an employer benefit from inducing differential value distributions for a promotion among his workers? Workers compete by exerting effort and higher effort corresponds to higher profit for the employer. Introducing inequalities in valuations makes workers' value more easily recognisable, reducing their information rent, which in turn increases effort. At the same time, inequalities lead to differences in promotion attainment, even if realised values are identical. This corresponds to a decrease in competition. We show that if value is re-distributed, the reduction in information rent outweighs the loss in competition, making discrimination between workers optimal.
主题Public Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15672
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544683
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Anja Prummer,Francesco Nava. DP15672 Discrimination in Promotion. 2021.
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