| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15679 |
| DP15679 Redistribution, Voting and Clientelism: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform | |
| Bruno Caprettini; Lorenzo Casaburi; Miriam Venturini | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many democracies around the world feature pervasive clientelist practices. Inequality is often considered a key determinant of these practices. By reducing inequality, redistributive policies may therefore undermine clientelism. However, by inducing gratitude and reciprocity among beneficiaries, redistribution may also initiate clientelist exchange. We study the long-term effects of a major redistribution policy: the 1950 Italian land reform. Using a panel spatial regression discontinuity and data for half a century, we show that the large-scale redistribution led to the emergence of a long-lasting clientelist system characterized by political brokers, patronage and targeted benefits. Within this system, the Christian Democratic party, which promoted the reform, experienced persistent electoral benefits. |
| 主题 | Economic History ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Redistribution Voting Clientelism Land reform Italy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15679-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544689 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno Caprettini,Lorenzo Casaburi,Miriam Venturini. DP15679 Redistribution, Voting and Clientelism: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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