G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15681
DP15681 Does CFPB Oversight Crimp Credit?
Matthew Plosser; James Vickery
发表日期2021-01-18
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study how regulatory oversight by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) affects mortgage credit supply and other aspects of bank behavior. We use a difference-in-differences approach exploiting changes in regulatory intensity and a size cutoff below which banks are exempt from CFPB scrutiny. CFPB oversight leads to a reduction in lending in the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) market, which primarily serves riskier borrowers. However, it is also associated with a lower transition probability from moderate to serious delinquency, suggesting that tighter regulatory oversight may reduce foreclosures. Our results underscore the trade-off between protecting borrowers and maintaining access to credit.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Consumer financial protection Regulation Mortgages Servicing Credit supply
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15681
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544690
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Matthew Plosser,James Vickery. DP15681 Does CFPB Oversight Crimp Credit?. 2021.
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