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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP15681 |
DP15681 Does CFPB Oversight Crimp Credit? | |
Matthew Plosser; James Vickery | |
发表日期 | 2021-01-18 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study how regulatory oversight by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) affects mortgage credit supply and other aspects of bank behavior. We use a difference-in-differences approach exploiting changes in regulatory intensity and a size cutoff below which banks are exempt from CFPB scrutiny. CFPB oversight leads to a reduction in lending in the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) market, which primarily serves riskier borrowers. However, it is also associated with a lower transition probability from moderate to serious delinquency, suggesting that tighter regulatory oversight may reduce foreclosures. Our results underscore the trade-off between protecting borrowers and maintaining access to credit. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Consumer financial protection Regulation Mortgages Servicing Credit supply |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15681 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544690 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Plosser,James Vickery. DP15681 Does CFPB Oversight Crimp Credit?. 2021. |
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